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Kapner: Proposed State Euthanasia Statutes: A Philosophical and Legal Ana

PROPOSED STATE EUTHANASIA STATUTES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
The word euthanasia is derived from the Greek eu, meaning
good, and thanatos,meaning death. Its meaning has been defined
in the English language as "[a] quiet and easy death," or
"[t]he action of inducing a quiet and easy death."' The word
and the concept derive their significance from the frailty of the
human condition, to which all people must ultimately succumb.
The concept draws its support from the compassion that we as
human beings feel towards those whose physical and mental conditions deteriorate beyond the point which they can bear while
they irreversibly move toward death. It is a fact that every person's body, barring unexpected accident, will at some time fall
victim to disease from without or decay from within, and it is to
this painful reality that the arguments for the administration of
euthanasia address themselves.
In recent years medical science has improved its ability to
prolong life through sophisticated life support systems while as
yet it has been unable to reverse the progress of fatal disease or
the ravages of total physical injury. We have seen an increasing
number of patients incurably ill, yet not allowed to die. This has
resulted in a renewed interest in euthanasia as a remedy. This
comment will examine the philosophical and legal underpinnings
of euthanasia legislation; and further, it will analyze three specific pieces of legislation to determine how they deal with the
major concerns of both the opponents and the supporters of
euthanasia.
Some Arguments For and Against Euthanasia
Doctor Leonard Colebrook, Chairman of the British Euthanasia Society in 1962, has written concerning the physical and
2
mental sufferings of patients dying slowly from terminal disease:
In addition to pain many of the unhappy victims of cancer
have to endure the mental misery associated with the presence
of a foul fungating growth; of slow starvation owing to difficulty
in swallowing; of painful and very frequent micturition; of obstruction of the bowels; of incontinence; and of the utter prostration that makes each day and night a 'death in life' .
1. THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

640 (2d ed. 1936).

2. DR.L. COLFBROoK, A PLAN FOR VOLUNTARY EUTHANASiA 5-6 (Euthanasia Society
pamphlet, 1962) cited in Downing, Euthanasia:The Human Context, in EUTHANASIA AND
THE RIGHT TO DEATH 18 (A.B. Downing ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as A.B. DowNING].
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. ..Medical progress has done much to alleviate suffering
during the past century, but, in honesty, it must be admitted
that the process of dying is still very often an ugly business.
Therefore, to relieve the sufferings of those who are dying
slowly and painfully, the advocates of euthanasia maintain that
human compassion demands that men and women suffering terminal illnesses have the right to choose a quick and painless
death or have such merciful death administered to them, if they
are beyond the point of conscious choice. On philosophical
grounds, such advocates reject the imposition of a life deprived
of "human spirit" upon those dying in agony. Joseph Fletcher,
Professor of Social Ethics and Moral Theology at the Episcopal
Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts writes:3
The beauty and spiritual depths of human stature are what
should be preserved and conserved in our value system, with the
flesh as the means rather than the end. The vitalist fallacy is to
view life at any old level as the highest good. This betrays us
into keeping 'vegetables' going and dragging the dying back to
brute 'life' just because we have the medical know-how to do it.
On legal grounds, the argument of the euthanasia advocates
is based upon the principle of liberty. Professor Glanville Williams has stated that the criminal law should not be invoked to
repress an individual's freedom to conduct his life as he sees fit,
unless such repression is "demonstrably necessary on social
grounds." Williams then poses the question, "What social interest is there in preventing the sufferer from choosing to accelerate
his death by a few months?" 4 This question brings into issue the
relationship between the criminal law and euthanasia, and the
various justifications that have been advanced for the absolute
prohibition of the intentional taking of a human life without legal
excuse. A legal analysis, however, will be deferred5 until the various types of euthanasia have been discussed and the basic arguments against euthanasia examined.
Proposals for the implementation of euthanasia can be broken into two distinct groups. The first group advocates the administration of a treatment (for example a drug) that will kill a
terminally ill person who has been suffering the pain of a slow
3. FLErCHER, The Patient'sRight to Die, in A.B. DOWNING, supra note 2, at 70.
4. Williams, EuthanasiaLegislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections,
in A.B. DOWNING, supra note 2, at 135.
5. See notes 18-62 and accompanying text, infra.
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death. Such a form of euthanasia is termed active euthanasia,
and its proponents have generally restricted calling for its application to situations where the dying patient has first requested
its administration. The second group advocates the withdrawal
of all life sustaining mechanisms and treatments (such as removal from a respirator or the non-performance of a blood transfusion) to allow a terminally ill patient to pass away quickly. This
form of euthanasia has been termed passive euthanasia.Its advocates are bolder than those calling for active euthanasia, in that
some maintain that life sustaining treatment should be withdrawn in situations where a dying patient is physically beyond
the capacity to give his consent. Such consent, they argue, can
be supplied by a close relative or even in certain situations, by
attending physicians.
The strongest argument against euthanasia in any form is
that it violates the principle of the sanctity of life, upon which
our laws and society have been founded.' The criminal law reflects the value placed upon life to the extent that it fails to
recognize as a defense to a prosecution for homicide either a motive on the part of a killer to mercifully relieve his victim from
suffering,7 or the consent of his victim to such an act.' That the
6. That the founders of this nation considered the sanctity of human life a fundamental principle is evidenced by the Declaration of Independence which states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men ....
The Constitution of the United States also safeguards the right to life, in that "No person
shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
7. In describing the motive element in the proof of murder, one court has stated:
If the proved facts established that the defendant in fact did the killing willfully,
that is, with intent to kill (which is presumed from the proof of the killing until
the contrary appears, .. ), and as the result of premeditation and deliberation,
there is murder in the first degree, no matter what defendant's motive may have
been .
This is so because the state has a deep interest and concern in the
preservation of the life of each of its citizens, and (except in cases of self-defense)
does not either commit or permit to any individual, no matter how kindly the
motive, either the right or the privilege of destroying such a life, except in
punishment for crime and in the manner prescribed by law.
State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 240-41, 119 A. 15, 17 (Bergen County Ct. 1922).
The Supreme Court of California has stated that the euthanasia killing of another,
although motivated solely by compassion, would constitute murder:
Thus, one who commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward his victim and
believes his act is morally justified, but he nonetheless acts with malice if he is
able to comprehend that society prohibits his act regardless of his personal
belief.
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 317, 411 P. 2d 911, 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1966).
8. An early Iowa decision, for example, stated:
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sanctity of life will remain predominant in our law for some time

to come, is amply demonstrated by the United States Supreme
Court decision of Furman v. Georgia' in which the Court struck
down death penalties administered by several states on the
ground that they constituted "cruel and unusual punishment"
as prohibited by the eighth amendment. In one of the concurring
opinions, Justice Brennan wrote:10
Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a
society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is that death is the ultimate sanction.
This natural human feeling appears all about us. There has been
no national debate about punishment, in general or by imprisonment, comparable to the debate about the punishment of
death. No other punishment has been so continuously restricted
• . .nor has any State yet abolished prisons, as some have abolished this punishment.

The concept of the sanctity of life expressed in the common
law was presaged by the proscription of the Sixth Commandment, "thou shalt not kill." Opposition to euthanasia on religious
grounds has been vigorously maintained by theological writers,
particularly those among the Catholic clergy. In his book, The
Sanctity of Life and the CriminalLaw, Glanville Williams outlines the Catholic argument against euthanasia:",
The most thorough presentation of the Catholic case

against euthanasia is that, by the Reverend Joseph V. Sullivan,
published in the Studies in Sacred Theology of the Catholic
University of America. The argument is that supreme dominion
over life belongs to God alone, and it is never lawful for man on

his own authority to kill the innocent directly. The author explains that God may authorize man to kill, as in the mass killing
The right to life and to personal safety is not only sacred in the estimation
of the common law, but it is inalienable. It is no defense to the defendant that
the abortion was procured with the consent of the deceased.
State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135-36 (1868).
And the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that the killing of another, although at his
own request, is not an excuse for murder.
Murder is no less murder because the homicide is committed at the desire
of the victim. He who kills another upon his desire or command is, in the
judgement of the law, as much a murderer as if he had done it merely of his
own head.
Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 671, 108 S.W.1139, 1141 (1908).
9. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
10. Id. at 286.
11. G. WILLIAMs, THE SANcTrrY OF LiFE AND THE CmMiNAL LAW 314 (1970).
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reported in Deuteronomy iii, 2-6; but he adds that 'today there
is no indication that God is giving anyone orders to kill the
innocent.' 'Innocent' in the thesis means a person who has not
been adjudged worthy of death by lawful authority, and who is
not a combatant opposing a nation that is fighting a just war,
or an unjust aggressor.
In any analysis of the relation of euthanasia to the criminal
law in this country, the establishment clause of the first amendment, interposing itself as a Constitutional barrier between
church and state, would seem to dictate that religious considerations be disregarded.12 Attacks against various euthanasia plans
have been launched on three other grounds, however. First, plans
advocating voluntary euthanasia, have been criticized on the
ground that a person suffering the physical and mental agonies
of a terminal illness, who may be heavily drugged to relieve his
pain, cannot truly make a rational, voluntary choice as to
whether he wishes to end his life. A physician who has treated
such terminally ill patients has written: 3
Anyone who has been severely ill knows how distorted his
judgment. became during the worst moments of the illness. Pain
and the toxic effect of disease, or the violent reaction to certain
surgical procedures may change our capacity for rational and
courageous thought.
A second source of attack is that all proposed euthanasia
plans require a determination by a physician that a patient has
reached a physical condition warranting the application of
euthanasia. Any such situation entails the risk that the physician
will be mistaken in his conclusion that his patient's condition is
terminal. The diagnostic skill of the physician, therefore, assumes
critical importance in the enormity of its effect upon the patient.
Yale Kamisar has stated with regard to the fallability of physi-

cians: 1
If the range of skill and judgment among licensed physicians
approaches the wide gap between the very best and the very
12. Nevertheless it is possible that the personal views of judges as well as legislatures
are indeed influenced by their religious upbringing.
13. Dr. Miller, WhyI OpposeMercy Killings,WoMAN'S HOME COMPANION, June, 1950,
at 38, cited in Kamisar, EuthanasiaLegislation:Some Non-Religious Objections, in A.B.
DOWNING, supra note 2, at 93. For a discussion of the major arguments against euthanasia

see id.
14. Kamisar, EuthanasiaLegislation: Some Non-Religious Objections, in A.B.
DOWNING, supra note 2, at 100.
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worst members of the bar-and I have no reason to think it does
not-then the minimally competent physician is hardly the man
to be given the responsibility for ending another's life.
Kamisar supports his statement by referring to a study undertaken by Doctor Daniel Laszlo, which dealt with error in the
diagnosis and management of patients thought to be suffering
from incurable illnesses. Doctor Laszlo wrote:' 5
The mass crowding of a group of patients labeled 'terminal' in
institutions designated for that kind of care carries a grave danger. The experience gathered from this group makes it seem
reasonable to conclude that a fresh evaluation of any large group
in mental institutions, in institutions for chronic care, or in
homes for the incurably sick, would unearth a rewarding number of salvageable patients who can be returned to their normal
place in society. . . . For purposes of this study we were especially interested in those with a diagnosis of advanced cancer.
In a number of these patients major errors in diagnosis or management were encountered.
The final, and perhaps most chilling argument against the
imposition of euthanasia in any form has been termed the "wedge
principle." The "wedge principle" holds that if we compromise
the value our society and laws place on the sanctity of human life,
even to the small extent dictated by compassion for those suffering terminal illness in great pain, then a wedge will be driven
through such value system. This, it is argued, would lead to a
gradual acceptance of other legally sanctioned acts of mercy for
those deemed by society to be less fortunate than ourselves.
Starting with the terminally ill, we may end with the congenitally
defective, mentally incompetent and perhaps even the socially
unacceptable.
Such a prediction is not to be glossed over lightly, as the
history of contemporary western civilization all too unfortunately
reveals. Doctor Leo Alexander, an expert medical advisor to the
prosecution at the Nuremburg trials, has described the deliberate
use by the Nazi Party of euthanasia for the terminally ill to gain
public acceptance for the later extermination of the politically,
socially and ethnically undesirable.'"
15. Drs. Lazslo, Colmer, Silver, Standard, Errorsin Diagnosisand Management of
Cancer, 33 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 670 (1950) cited in Kamisar, supra note 15, at
101.

16. Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship,241
MEDICINE

NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF

39, 40, 44 (1949) cited in Kamisar, supra note 15, at 115-16.
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Even before the Nazis took open charge in Germany, a propaganda barrage was directed against the traditional compassionate nineteenth-century attitudes toward the chronically ill,
and for the adoption of a utilitarian, Hegelian point of
view. . . . Lay opinion was not neglected in this campaign.
Adults were propagandized by motion pictures, one of which,
entitled 'I Accuse', deals entirely with euthanasia. This film
depicts the life history of a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis; in it her husband, a doctor, finally kills her to the accompaniment of soft piano music rendered by a sympathetic colleague in an adjoining room. Acceptance of this ideology was
implanted even in the children. A widely used high-school
mathematics text . . . included problems stated in distorted
terms of the cost of caring for and rehabilitating the chronically
sick and crippled. One of the problems asked, for instance, how
many new housing units could be built and how many marriageallowance loans could be given to newly wedded couples for the
amount of money it cost the state to care for 'the crippled, the
criminal and the insane. . . .' The beginnings at first were
merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of the
physicians. It startedwith the acceptance of the attitude, basic
in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life
not worthy to be lived. This attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically sick.
Gradually the sphere of those to be included in this category was
enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted and finally all nonGermans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely small
wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind received
its impetus was the attitude toward the non-rehabilitatable
sick.
Euthanasia,the CriminalLaw and the Constitution
The criminal law in respect to active euthanasia is clear and
absolute in its protection of the sanctity of human life, as has
been demonstrated. Passive euthanasia, however, stands in a different light in its relation to the criminal law. The withdrawal or
the non-performance of life sustaining medical treatment by a
physician may be viewed as an act of omission. Criminal liability
for the death which necessarily results will be found only when
the physician was under a duty to treat his patient at the time
he ceased to provide medical care. 7 This duty must be imposed
17. Generally speaking, in order that a person who fails to provide such atten-
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by law, not merely by morality."8
A legal duty to provide medical care for another will be found
where a statute imposes such duty, on the basis of a relationship
such as parent and child, on the basis of a contractual obligation
to care for another, and in a situation where one has assumed the
care of another and has secluded such person from other aid."'
A contractual duty will be found to exist once a physician has
assumed the care of a patient. 0 Such duty of care is not absolute
however, and may be terminated by consent of the parties, by
dismissal of the physician by the patient and by withdrawal by
the physician after giving his patient proper notice.2" It would
seem to follow that in cases of voluntary passive euthanasia, the
consent by a patient to his physician's withdrawal of medical
treatment is tantamount to the dismissal of his doctor, and as
such terminates any further legal obligation on the part of the
physician. Thus the physician could not be subjected to criminal
liability for his failure to perform any further medical treatment.
Voluntary passive euthanasia legislation is also amenable to
a favorable constitutional interpretation based on the right to
privacy. A patient's decision, based on consultations with his or
her doctor and family, to refuse the administration of medical
treatment while slowly dying from an illness from which there is
tion may be found criminally liable under general statutes defining murder or
manslaughter, it must be shown that (1) such person owed a duty to furnish
medical care to one in need thereof; (2) the conduct of such person in not
furnishing medical care, or in failing to furnish sufficient or timely medical care,
amounted to willfulness or culpable negligence; and (3) the lack of medical care,
or sufficient and timely medical care, was the proximate cause, or a contributing
cause of death.
Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 483, 487 (1965).
18. 'This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected
must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation." People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich.
206, 209, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907).
19. See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 483 (1965).
20. "The law is well settled that a physician or surgeon, upon undertaking an operation or other case, is under the duty, in the absence of an agreement limiting the service,
of continuing his attention, after the first operation or first treatment, so long as the case
requires attention." Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, , 64 P.2d 208, 211 (1937).
"It is the undoubted law that a physician may elect whether or not he will give his
services to a case, but, having accepted his employment, and entered upon the discharge
of his duties, he is bound to devote to the patient his best skill and attention, .
Lathrope v. Flood, 6 Cal. Unrep. 637, -,
63 P. 1007, 1007 (1901).
21. "The obligation of continuing attention can be terminated only by the cessation
of the necessity which gave rise to the relationship, or by the discharge of the physician
by the patient, or by the withdrawal from the case by the physician after giving the patient
reasonable notice so as to enable the patient to secure other medical attention." Ricks v.
Budge, 91 Utah 307, _
, 64 P. 2d 208, 211-12 (1937).
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no hope of recovery, can be seen as being of an entirely personal
nature, having no adverse effect on the state or other people, and
thus lying within a constitutionally defined zone of privacy.
The concept of zones of privacy was enunciated by Justice
22
Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance ...
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
... .The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him
to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides:
'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.'
Assuming then, that the limited right of a terminally ill patient to choose to die quickly and peacefully could be included
within a constitutional zone of privacy,2 3 when could a state
through its penal law or otherwise, seek to restrict such right?
Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Griswold provides
2
the basis for an answer:
In a long series of cases this court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged
by states simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal
22. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

The Griswold case involved a Connecticut statute which forbade using or counselling the
use of contraceptive devices. The Court held that the statute intruded on a right of privacy
which emanated from the Bill of Rights and encompassed the marital relationship.
23. The right of personal privacy expounded by the Supreme Court in Griswoldwas
expanded in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to "encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy," at least within the first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at
153. Although on the surface this holding would appear to add support for passive euthanasia, the Court carefully limited this right to personal privacy to the case before it, stating,
"The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear
to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with
one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously

articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right
of this kind in the past." Id. at 154.
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
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liberty, the state may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524.
Thus a state would need a compelling interest to restrict the
right of a patient to voluntary passive euthanasia. Although there

are no cases dealing with the withdrawal of medical treatment at
a patient's request to implement euthanasia, cases involving attempts by hospitals and state officials to obtain court orders compelling Jehovah's Witnesses to submit to life-preserving blood
transfusions are analogous. Compelling a Jehovah's Witness to
submit to a blood transfusion against his will and the dictates of
his religion has been viewed as a restriction on his first amendment right to freedom of religion. However, in certain circumstances, several courts have held that the state's interest in keeping such a patient from dying is "compelling" and as such overrides any exercise of freedom of religion.
In Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown
College, 5 Judge Skelly Wright of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit signed a court order
giving a hospital the authority to administer blood transfusions
necessary to save the life of a Jehovah's Witness who was the
young mother of a seven month old child. Judge Wright found
that, because the patient was "in extremis and hardly compos
mentis at the time in question, she was as little able competently
to decide for herself as any child would be." Therefore, the state
had a duty to assume "the responsibility of guardianship for her,
as for a child, at least to the extent of authorizing treatment to
save her life. 2' 6 Because she was the mother of a seven month old

child, "the state as parens patriae, [would] not allow [her] to
abandon her child, .... ." Her lack of current capacity to make
a valid choice, coupled with the fact that a life hung in the balance, combined to give the 2state
a compelling interest in allowing
7
the immediate transfusion.

In United States v. George's the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut found a compelling state interest
25. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 1008.
27. Id. at 1009.
The position of the hospital and doctors in the case was also considered, the court
seeing their choice as being between "administering the proper treatment or letting Mrs.
Jones die in the hospital bed, thus exposing themselves, and the hospital, to the risk of
civil and criminal liability. .. ."
28. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
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in the "doctor's conscience and professional oath," in a situation
where a Jehovah's Witness who was the father of four children
voluntarily submitted to hospital care but refused to allow a life
sustaining blood transfusion. In upholding an order allowing the
hospital to perform the transfusion, the court stated that it would
not "require the doctors to ignore the mandates of their own
21 9
conscience, even in the name of free religious exercise.
Absent such overriding state interests, however, other courts
have held that Jehovah's Witnesses could not be forced to submit
to blood transfusions, even when necessary to save their lives. For
example, in In the Matter of Osborne0 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals denied a request for the appointment of a guardian to consent to the administration of a blood transfusion as part
of the emergency treatment given to a hospital patient who was
a Jehovah's Witness. Although the patient was the father of two
minor children, the court reasoned that in the event of his death,
due to the close family relationship which existed, "the children
would be well cared for, and that the family business would continue to supply material needs. ' 31 The court determined that the
patient's mind was clear and that he was physically capable of
making a rational choice.3 2 The court also noted that the patient
had executed a statement refusing to submit to the transfusion
and releasing the hospital from liability.n In sustaining a lower
3
court denial of the request the court concluded,
In reaching her decision, Judge Bacon necessarily resolved the
two critical questions presented-(1) has the patient validly and
knowingly chosen this course for his life, and (2) is there compelling state interest which justifies overriding that decision?
Based on this unique record, we have been unable to conclude
that judicial intervention respecting the wishes and religious
beliefs of the patient was warranted under our law.
In In re Estate of Brooks3 the Illinois Supreme Court held
29. Id. at 754.
30. 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).

31. Id. at 374.
32. Id.
This was sufficient for the court to distinguish the case from Application of President
& Directors of Georgetown Coll., 331 F.2d 1000 (1964), for the court noted that the patient
there lacked the current capacity to make a valid choice. In the Matter of Osborne, 294
A.2d 372, 375 n.4 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).

33. Id. at 373.
34. Id. at 375.
35. 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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that the state could not force a Jehovah's Witness, who was mentally competent, did not have any minor children and who had
executed a release, to submit to a blood transfusion. The court
dealt extensively with the question of freedom of religion, stressing that such freedom hinged upon what it termed a constitutional "right to be let alone," thus grounding its decision in terms
closely akin to a right to privacy. 6
Even though we may consider appellant's beliefs unwise, foolish
or ridiculous, in the absence of an overriding danger to society
we may not permit interference therewith in the form of a conservatorship established in the waning hours of her life for the
sole purpose of compelling her to accept medical treatment forbidden by her religious principles, and previously refused by her
with full knowledge of the probable consequences. In the final
analysis, what has happened here involves a judicial attempt to
decide what course of action is best for a particular individual,
notwithstanding that individual's contrary views based upon
religious convictions. Such action cannot be constitutionally
countenanced.
"'The makers of our Constitution.

.

.sought to protect Ameri-

cans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred as against the Government, the right
to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights, and the right
most valued by civilized man.' Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928)- (dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis).
Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis
thought an individual possessed these rights only as to sensible
beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded
sensations. I suggest he intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform,
such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk."37
A similar result was reached by a lower New York court,
despite the fact that the patient's refusal of a transfusion was not
based on religious grounds. In Erickson v. Dilgard", Judge Bernard Meyer held that a "competent and capable" adult patient
of the county hospital, who had made a "calculated decision" to
refuse a blood transfusion prior to an operation, could not be
compelled to submit, even though the county maintained that
36. Id. at _,

205 N.E.2d at 442.

37. Id. citing Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Coll., 331 F.2d 1000,
1016-17 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Judge Burger).
38. 44 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
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such refusal was tantamount to suicide. Judge Meyer reasoned,39
[I]t is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision
who has the final say and that this must necessarily be so in a
system of government which gives the greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his own desires.
Assuming that the patient's choice of voluntary passive
euthanasia has a constitutional basis grounded in the right to
privacy, the argument for allowing such a choice appears to be
as compelling as that advanced in the Jehovah's Witness cases
for allowing them to refuse transfusions. If the state does not have
an overriding interest, based upon the sanctity of life, to force a
person to submit to a blood transfusion against his religious beliefs when such transfusion will not only sustain life but will make
possible his recovery, how can the state compel a person whose
condition is terminal to continue to receive treatment which will
only delay for a short time his inevitable demise?
Proposed EuthanasiaLegislation
Having demonstrated that voluntary passive euthanasia
would be grounded in a constitutional right, it remains to examine euthanasia legislation recently proposed in several states,
highlighting both the strengths and weaknesses of the various
proposals.
Euthanasia bills have been proposed in the legislatures of
eight states between 1971 and the present,40 while in eight more
states bills are in the process of being drafted.41 Only two of the
proposed bills go so far as to establish procedures for the implementation of active euthanasia, and these only advocate it in a
voluntary form. 2 The remainder confine themselves to legalizing
the withdrawal of all life sustaining treatment from a terminally
ill patient, with his consent. Some of these, additionally, make
provision for consent by next of kin in situations where the patient is physically incapable of rendering such consent.43
39. Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
40. H.R. 251, 127th Del. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973); H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla. Leg.;
H. 3641 1974 Mass. Gen. Ct.; H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 2997, 57th

Ore. Leg. Ass. (1973) (passive euthanasia); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. (1973) (active
euthanasia); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. (1973); S. 358, 1972 W. Va. Leg.; S. 670, 1971 Wisc.
Leg.
41. California; Hawaii; Idaho; Illinois; Maryland; New York; Tennessee; Utah.
42. H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. (1973).
43. H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla. Leg. §§ 2-3; H.R. 2997, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 3 (1973);
S. 358, 1972 W.Va. Leg. § 16-24-3.
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Most are similar in that they employ protective measures
against mistaken diagnosis by the attending physician and lack
of voluntariness in the patient's decision to submit to euthanasia
which provide that: terminal illness sufficient to qualify a patient for coverage of the euthanasia act is specifically defined;"
physicians other than the attending physician must concur in
writing that the patient is in such a defined condition;" the
patient must execute a declaration authorizing his physicians
to withdraw medical treatment or in the case of the active
euthanasia bills, administer euthanasia, in the event he should
succumb to the defined terminal illness (such declaration may
be executed well in advance of pronounced physical deterioration or even before the onset of such condition," thus removing
any influence which depression and pain caused by disease play
in the patient's decision). In addition, form declarations are provided47 and safeguards similar to those required for the execution
of a will are required for the document's proper execution." Before withdrawal of medical treatment or application of euthanasia, the physician must reconfirm the patient's intent as expressed in the document, or if the patient is physically incapable
of expressing such intention, the physician must confirm the
voluntariness of the original declaration;" and the patient can
revoke such document at any time."
Some of the bills make provision for the right of a doctor or
44. H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla. Leg. § 1; H. 3641, 1974 Mass. Gen. Ct. § 2(1); H. 137,
43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 3(4)(a)-(b) (1973); H.R. 2997, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 1(3)
(1973); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. §§ 2 (4) (a)-(b) (1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. § 4 (4)
(1973).
45. H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla. Leg. § 2(3); H. 3641, 1974 Mass. Gen. Ct. § 3; S. 2449,
43rd Wash. Leg. § 4(3) (1973).
46. H.R. 251, 127th Del. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. § 602 (1973); H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla,
Leg. Ass. § 1 (1974); H. 3641, 1974 Mass. Gen. Ct. §§ 2(4), 3; H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg.,
1st Sess. §§ 4, 5 (1973); H.R. 2997, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 2 (1973); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg.
Ass. § 2(5) (1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. §§ 5-6 (1973); S. 358, 1972 W.Va. Leg. § 1624-1.
47. H. 3641, 1974 Mass. Gen. Ct. § 2(4); H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg. § 5 (1973); S. 179,
57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 2(5) (1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. § 6 (1973).
48. H.R. 251, 127th Del. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. § 602 (1973); H. 3641, 1974 Mass. Gen.
Ct. § 2(4); H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. § 5 (1973); H.R. 2997, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass.
§ 2(2) (1973); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 2(5) (1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. § 6
(1973); S. 358, 1972 W.Va. Leg. § 16-24-2 (1972); S. 670, 1971 Wisc. Leg. § 2.
49. H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 6(2)-(3) (1973); S. 179, Ore. Leg. Ass. § 5(1)
(1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. §§ 9(1)-(2) (1973).
50. H.R. 251, 127th Del. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. § 602 (1973); H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla.
Leg. § 6; H. 3641, 1974 Mass. Gen. Ct. § 3; H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 4(3),
8; H.R. 2997, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. §§ 5(1)-(2); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 4(3); S. 2449,
43rd Wash. Leg. § 7 (1973).
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hospital to refuse to participate in the euthanasia on conscientious grounds." In certain instances, abuse of the euthanasia process is to be punished by severe criminal penalties, including life
imprisonment.5 2 Finally, some bills provide for the nonimpairment of life insurance policies in effect for at least one year
before the implementation of euthanasia. 3
For the purposes of this paper, the proposed euthanasia bills
of Florida,54 Washington,55 and Oregon5" have been selected for
further analysis. The proposed Oregon Senate Bill goes beyond
those proposed in Florida and Washington in that it attempts to
implement a system of euthanasia through which a patient in an
"irremediable condition"5 7 may have his life terminated by a
"treatment prescribed by a physician"" by virtue of his having
previously executed a document authorizing such "treatment."
Because this amounts to the legally sanctioned killing of one
human being by another, any such program will be subject to the
crushing weight of attack by all the major arguments against
euthanasia. Since the sanctity of human life with its corresponding absolute prohibition of any intentional killing of another
human being without legal excuse, has served as the underpinning of the criminal law in this country,59 any euthanasia legislation must be carefully drafted so as to provide both an acceptable
definition of the physical and mental condition necessary for the
imposition of such "treatment."
Although the Oregon bill provides such previously examined
safeguards as (1) the requirement that two physicians certify the
patient to be in an "irremediable condition,"6 (2) the requirement that the patient execute a formal document authorizing the
administration of "treatment" well in advance of qualification for
such "treatment,"6 1 and (3) the requirement that the physician
51. H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. § 6(5) (1973); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass.
§ 5(3) (1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. §§ 9(3)-(4) (1973).
52. H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. § 9 (1973); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 7(1)
(1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. § 8 (1973).
53. H. 137, 43rd Mont. Leg., 1st Sess. § 10 (1973); S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. § 8
(1973); S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. § 11 (1973).
54. H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla. Leg. See Appendix I for complete bill.
55. S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. (1973). See Appendix 11 for complete bill.
56. S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. (1973). See Appendix III for complete bill.
57. Id. at § 2(4).
58. Id. at § 3.
59. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text, supra.
60. Id. at § 2(3).
61. Id. at §§ 2(5), 3.
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who is to administer euthanasia must ascertain if the patient has
not changed his intent,12 the bill displays weakness in its definition of an "irremediable condition." Section 2 (4) (b) expands the
definition of such condition beyond incurable, terminal and subject to severe distress to "a condition of brain damage and deterioration such that a person's normal mental faculties are severely
and irreparably impaired to such an extent that he has been
rendered incapable of leading a rational existence." Such a provision might be considered unacceptable in that it would result in
patients who would not have died otherwise, being dispatched
because of their incapacity to lead a "rational existence."
Although voluntary passive euthanasia appears to be acceptable under the criminal law and subject to favorable constitutional interpretation, the bill proposed in the Florida Legislature 3
becomes weakened and unacceptable, in the opinion of this
author, by attempting to make provision for the terminally ill
patient who is incapable of consenting to the withdrawal of medical treatment. Section 2 provides that in such a situation "a
spouse or person of the first degree of kinship shall be allowed to
make such a decision, provided written consent is obtained from
a majority of all persons of the first degree of kinship." 4 In the
event no such person can be located, the Florida bill goes even
further, placing the decision to terminate medical treatment in
the hands of "three licensed physicians.""5 Withdrawal of medical
treatment under such circumstances would ordinarily result in
liability under the criminal law. Aside from any legal consideration, however, the desirability of this provision may be gauged by
the answer to the following question: would you want your relatives (possibly your legatees and your heirs), or in their absence
three doctors, who are routinely exposed to death as part of their
profession, to decide that since you are to die shortly anyway,
your life should not be further extended by medical means?
Conclusion: A Model EuthanasiaBill
The proposed Washington Senate Bill" is, in this author's
view, an example of a well drafted voluntary passive euthanasia
bill which provides many desirable safeguards and few if any
discernible weaknesses. Coverage under the bill is limited to
62. Id. at § 5(1).

63. H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla. Leg.
64. Id. at § 2.
65. Id. at § 3.
66. S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. (1973).
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those who have a "serious physical disability which is diagnosed
as incurable and terminal," where there is "no expectation of
regaining health. 6' 7 The bill requires the voluntary filing of a
signed, witnessed, and notarized written declaration authorizing
the "withdrawal of life sustaining mechanisms"6 8 at least thirty
days prior to any cessation of medical treatment by a physician.69
This minimizes the influencing factors of depression and pain,
caused by the advanced stages of a terminal disease, which play
in the patient's decision to forego life sustaining medical treatment. The bill makes provision for the revocation of such declaration by the patient" and provides further insurance that the patient's decision is truly voluntary by requiring the physician in
charge in the case of a mentally responsible patient to "ascertain," to his "reasonable satisfaction that the declaration and all
steps proposed to be taken under it are in accord with the patient's wishes." 71 Furthermore, in the case of a patient, "incapable of communicating," the physician is required to "be satisfied
that the patient had voluntarily made application for such withdrawal while he was mentally responsible and had requested such
was incapacitated and could not acwithdrawal in the event he
'72
tually request it himself.
The Washington bill also makes provision for physicians and
institutions that conscientiously object to euthanasia, 73 provides
harsh penalties for the willful abuse of the euthanasia apparatus,74 and provides for the continuation of life insurance that has
been in effect for more than one year.7 5 It is this author's opinion
that such draft legislation may well be the precursor of a governmentally created apparatus through which those who are dying
in slow agony may be granted the mercy of a swift, painless death.
Erik Kapner
67. Id. at § 4(4).
68. Id. at § 5.

69. Id. at § 5(2).
70. Id. at § 7.
71. Id. at § 9(1).
72. Id. at § 9(2).
73. Id. at §§ 9(3)-(4).

74. Id. at § 8.
75. Id. at § 11.
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APPENDIX I
H.J. Res. 3007, 1974 Fla. Leg.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. As used in this act terminal illness or injury
means any illness or injury that would result in natural expiration
of life regardless of the use or discontinuance of medical treatment to sustain the life processes. Any person eighteen (18) years
of age or older and competent may at any time execute a document directing that medical treatment designed solely to sustain
the life processes be discontinued. However, said document shall
not take effect until said person has been declared terminally ill
or injured by two (2) licensed physicians and attested to by written statement.
Section 2. In the event any terminally ill or injured person has failed to comply with section 1 above because he is unable
to make such a decision due to mental or physical incapacity, as
determined by two (2) licensed physicians, a spouse or person of
the first degree of kinship shall be allowed to make such a decision, provided written consent is obtained from a majority of all
persons of the first degree of kinship.
Section 3. In the event the terminally ill or injured person is incompetent and the procedure authorized by section 2
cannot be complied with because no person of the first degree of
kinship can be located within thirty (30) days, then the decision
to terminate medical procedures solely to sustain the life processes may be ordered by three (3) licensed physicians and attested to by a written statement.
Section 4. A physician who relies on a document authorized by section 1 to refuse medical treatment or who makes a
determination of terminal illness or injury shall be presumed to
be acting in good faith and, unless negligent, shall be immune
from civil or criminal liability that otherwise might be incurred.
Section 5. No person participating in good faith in the
execution of a statement or document required by the provisions
of this act shall be deemed to be in violation of section 782.08,
Florida Statutes.
Section 6. A person who has executed a document to refuse medical treatment shall have the power to revoke said document at any time by oral or written statement; provided however,
that such revocation must be witnessed by two (2) persons.
Section 7. This act shall take effect upon becoming law.
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APPENDIX II
S. 2449, 43rd Wash. Leg. (1973)
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON:
NEW SECTION. Section 1. This act shall be known and
may be cited as the "Death with dignity act of 1973."
NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. With the firm conviction that any
individual should make the important decisions of daily living
after he has reached majority, it is hereby declared that he should
also be allowed the right to make the crucial, final decision as to
the manner in which he dies.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 3. Subject to the provisions of this
chapter, it shall be lawful for a physician to withdraw life sustaining mechanisms from a qualified patient who has previously
made a declaration that is lawfully in force at the time of such
withdrawal.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 4. For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Physician" means a medical practitioner licensed
under the provisions of chapters 18.57 or 18.71 RCW;
(2) "Withdrawal of life sustaining mechanisms" means
cessation of use of those techniques and applications which prolong life through artificial means;
(3) "Qualified patient" means an individual, over the age
of eighteen, in respect of whom two physicians have certified in
writing that the patient appears to be suffering from an irremediable condition;
(4) "Irremediable condition" means a serious physical disability which is diagnosed as incurable and terminal, and which
is expected to cause a person severe distress, or to render him
incapable of a rational existence, with no expectation of regaining
health; and
(5) "Declaration" means a witnessed declaration in writing made substantially in the form set forth in section 6 of this
act.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 5. Subject to the provisions of this
chapter a declaration may be made by any individual on the form
described in section 6 of this act that he voluntarily submits to
the withdrawal of life sustaining mechanisms if he should become
a qualified patient. The declaration shall not be effective unless:
(1) It has been filed with the county clerk in the county
of the individual's residence;
(2) It has been filed at least thirty days prior to withdrawal of life sustaining mechanisms;
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(3) It has not been subsequently revoked, and
(4) It contains the individual's fingerprints.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 6. The declaration shall be a sworn
statement, duly notarized, and executed in the presence of two
witnesses who shall sign the declaration. It shall be made in the
following form:
"DECLARATION made this day of

(date) by
name) of

(person's
(place of residence)
I,
, DECLARE that I voluntarily subscribe to
the code set out under the following articles.
Article A
If I should at any time suffer from a serious physical illness
or impairment reasonably thought in my case to be incurable and
expected to cause me severe distress or render me incapable of
rational existence, I request the withdrawal of life sustaining
mechanisms at a time or in circumstances to be indicated or
specified by me, or if it is apparent that I have become incapable
of giving directions, at the discretion of my spouse or a person of
first degree of kinship, and/or the physician in charge of my case.
Article B
In the event of my suffering from the conditions specified in
Article A, I request that no active steps should be taken, and in
particular that no resuscitory techniques should be used, to
prolong my life or restore me to consciousness.
Article C
This declaration is to remain in force unless I revoke it, which
I may do at any time, and any request I may make concerning
action to be taken or withheld in connection with this declaration
will be made without further formalities.
I wish it to be understood that I have confidence in the good
faith of my relatives and physicians, and fear degeneration and
indignity far more than I fear premature death. I ask and authorize my family members and the physician in charge of my case
to bear these statements in mind when considering what my
wishes would be in any uncertain situation.
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135

FINGERPRINTS

SIGNED
WITNESS
WITNESS
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of
Notary Public
Residing At

"

NEW SECTION. Sec. 7. A declaration may be revoked at
any time. Any person wishing to revoke a declaration shall file a
request with the county clerk having custody of the declaration.
When the county clerk is satisfied that the person requesting the
revocation is the same person who made the declaration, he shall
mark "revoked" in large letters across the face of the declaration
and the signed revocation request shall be filed with the revoked
declaration.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 8. Any person who wilfully conceals,
destroys, falsifies, or forges a declaration or revocation provided
for in this chapter shall be guilty of a felony. Upon conviction
such person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 9. (1) Before withdrawing life sustaining mechanisms from a mentally responsible patient, the
physician in charge shall be satisfied that the patient's consent
is voluntarily given, by ascertaining to the physician's reasonable
satisfaction that the declaration and all steps proposed to be
taken under it are in accord with the patient's wishes.
(2) Before causing withdrawal of life sustaining mechanisms from a mentally incompetent patient, or one who is incapable of communicating, the physician in charge shall be satisfied
that the patient had voluntarily made application for such withdrawal while he was mentally responsible and had requested such
withdrawal in the event he was incapacitated and could not actually request it himself.
(3) No person shall be under any duty, whether by contract, by statute or by other legal requirement, to participate in
any aspect of the removal of life sustaining mechanisms authorized by this chapter to which he has a conscientious objection.
(4) If any physician or institution shall refuse to withdraw
life sustaining mechanisms from a qualified patient who has filed
the declaration provided for in section 6 of this act, such fact shall
be communicated immediately to the county board of health by
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the physician or institution. The county board of health shall
then proceed to make arrangements to carry out the desires of the
patient as soon as possible.
(5) For the purpose of ascertaining whether such declaration has been filed as provided for in this chapter, and to carry
out the desires of a qualified patient, the county clerk and county
board of health shall establish such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the intent of this chapter.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 10. A physician who, acting in good
faith, causes the removal of life sustaining mechanisms from a
qualified patient, in accordance with this chapter, shall not be
guilty of any offense.
Physicians who take part in the withdrawal of life sustaining
mechanisms in accordance with this chapter shall not be deemed
to be in breach of any professional oath or affirmation.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 11. No policy of insurance that has
been in force for more than twelve months shall be vitiated or
legally impaired in any way by the withdrawal of life sustaining
mechanisms from the insured.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 12. A patient suffering from an irremediable condition reasonably thought in his case to be terminal
shall be entitled to the administration of whatever quantity of
drugs may be required to keep him free from pain, and such a
patient in whose case severe distress cannot otherwise be relieved,
shall, if he so requests, be entitled to drugs rendering him continuously unconscious.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 13. The department of social and
health services shall make rules and regulations, pursuant to
chapter 34.04 RCW, to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 14. Sections 1 through 14 of this act
shall constitute a new chapter in Title 70 ROW.
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APPENDIX III
S. 179, 57th Ore. Leg. Ass. (1973)
A BILL FOR AN ACT
Relating to voluntary euthanasia; providing penalties; and declaring an emergency.
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the Voluntary Euthanasia Act of 1973.
SECTION 2. As used in this Act, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Physician" means a registered medical practitioner.
(2) "Euthanasia" means the painless inducement of
death.
(3) "Qualified patient" means a patient over the age that
qualifies a person to vote in either state or national elections, and
in respect of whom two physicians, one being of consultant status,
have certified in writing that the patient appears to them to be
suffering from an irremediable condition.
(4) "Irremediable condition" means either:
(a) A serious physical illness which is diagnosed as incurable and terminal, and which is expected to cause a person
severe distress, or to render him incapable of a rational existence,
or
(b) A condition of brain damage or deterioration such
that a person's normal mental faculties are severely and irreparably impaired to such an extent that he has been rendered incapable of leading a rational existence.
(5) "Declaration" means a witnessed declaration in writing made substantially in the following form:
Declaration Under the Voluntary Euthanasia
Act of 1973
(and re-executed
19Declaration made
19-)
by
of

I DECLARE that I voluntarily subscribe to the code set out under
the following articles:
A. If I should at any time suffer from a serious physical illness
or impairment reasonably thought in my case to be incurable and
expected to cause me severe distress or render me incapable of
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rational existence, I request the administration of euthanasia at
a time or in circumstances to be indicated or specified by me or,
if it is apparent that I have become incapable of giving directions,
at the discretion of the physician in charge of my case.
B. In the event of my suffering from any of the conditions specified above, I request that no active steps should be taken, and in
particular that no resuscitory techniques should be used, to prolong my life or restore me to consciousness.
C. This declaration is to remain in force unless I revoke it, which
I may do at any time by any clearly communicated act, and any
request I may make concerning action to be taken or withheld in
connection with this declaration will be made without further
formalities.
I WISH it to be understood that I have confidence in the good
faith of my relatives and physicians, and fear degeneration and
indignity far more than I fear premature death. I ask and authorize the physician in charge of my case to bear these statements
in mind when considering what my wishes would be in any uncertain situation.
SIGNED
and
(SIGNED ON RE-EXECUTION)
WE TESTIFY that the above-named declarant voluntarily
(signed) (was unable to write but voluntarily assented to) this
declaration in our-presence, and appeared to us to appreciate its
full significance. We do not know of any pressure being brought
on him to make the declaration, and we believe it is made by his
own wish. So far as we are aware, we are entitled to attest this
declaration and do not stand to benefit by the death of the declarant.
Signed by
Signed by
of

of

(Signed by

(Signed by

of

of

on re-execution).

on re-execution).

_

SECTION 3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall
be lawful for a physician to administer euthanasia to a qualified
patient who has previously made a declaration that is lawfully in
force at the time of the administering of euthanasia.
SECTION 4. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section,
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a declaration shall come into force 30 days after being made and
shall remain in force, unless revoked, for three years.
(2) A declaration re-executed after the lapse of one year
from its execution date and prior to its expiration date shall remain in force, unless revoked, during the lifetime of the declarant.
(3) A declaration may be revoked at any time by destruction or by notice of cancellation shown on its face, or by any other
clearly communicated act of revocation, effected, in any case, by
the declarant or to his order.
SECTION 5. (1) Before causing euthanasia to be administered to a mentally responsible patient the physician in charge
shall make sure that the patient's consent is voluntarily given by
ascertaining to the physician's reasonable satisfaction that the
declaration and all steps proposed to be taken under it currently
are in accord with the patient's wishes, and if the physician
should determine that the motivation or desire for euthanasia is
supplied by relatives, or anyone other than the patient, then he
shall not cause euthanasia to be administered.
(2) Euthanasia shall be deemed to be administered by a
physician if treatment prescribed by a physician is given to the
patient by a registered nurse.
(3) No person shall be under any duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate
in any aspect of treatment or euthanasia authorized by this Act
to which he has a conscientious objection.
SECTION 6. (1) A physician or nurse who, acting in good
faith, causes euthanasia to be administered to a qualified patient
in accordance with what the person so acting reasonably believes
to be the patient's declaration and wishes shall not be guilty of
any offense.
(2) Physicians and nurses who have taken part in the
administration of euthanasia shall be deemed not to be in breach
of any professional oath or affirmation.
SECTION 7. (1) It shall be an offense punishable, upon
conviction, by a sentence of life imprisonment for any person
wilfully to conceal, destroy, falsify or forge a declaration with
intent to create the false impression that another person desires
euthanasia.
(2) It shall be an offense punishable, upon conviction, by
a sentence up to 10 years imprisonment or a fine of up to $5,000,
or both, for any person wilfully to conceal, destroy, falsify or forge
a declaration with intent to create the false impression that an-
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other person does not desire, or no longer desires, euthanasia.
(3) A person signing a declaration by way of attestation
who wilfully puts his signature to a statement he knows to be false
shall be deemed to have committed an offense under ORS
162.065.
SECTION 8. No policy of insurance that has been in force
for 12 months shall be vitiated or legally impaired in any way, by
the administration of euthanasia to the insured.
SECTION 9. For the removal of doubt it is declared that
a patient suffering from 'an irremediable condition reasonably
thought in his case to be terminal shall be entitled to the administration of whatever quantity of drugs may be required to keep him
free from pain, and such a patient in whose case severe distress
cannot be otherwise relieved, shall, if he so requests, be entitled
to drugs rendering him continuously unconscious.
SECTION 10. The Department of Human Resources shall
make regulations under this Act for determining classes of persons who may or may not sign a declaration by way of attestation,
for regulating the care and custody of declarations, for appointing, with their consent, hospital physicians having responsibility
in relation to patients who have made or wish to make a declaration, and for the prescribing of any matters he may think fit to
prescribe for achieving the purposes of this Act.
SECTION 11. This Act being necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency
is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect upon its passage.
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